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Abstract
This paper describes the implementation of a threshold cryptosystem for
Civitas, a secure electronic voting system. The cryptosystem improves the
availability of Civitas by enabling tabulation to complete despite the failure
of some agents. The implementation includes a sophisticated distributed key
generation protocol, which was designed by Gennaro, Jarecki, Krawczyk,
and Rabin. The cryptosystem is implemented in Jif, a security-typed lan-
guage.
1 Introduction
Voting systems are hard to make trustworthy because they have strong, conﬂict-
ing security requirements: voters must be convinced that their votes are tallied
correctly, while the secrecy of those votes must also be maintained—even when
someone tries to buy votes or physically coerce voters. Civitas [1] is an electronic
remote voting system that satisﬁes these requirements and offers assurance through
both cryptographic security proofs and information-ﬂow analysis.
The original implementation of Civitas used a distributed El Gamal cryptosys-
tem. A cryptosystem is a set of three protocols—key generation, encryption, and
decryption—and a distributed cryptosystem is a cryptosystem in which a set of
agents must cooperate to perform decryption. A distributed cryptosystem improves
Supported in part by National Science Foundation grant 0430161. Michael Clarkson is sup-
ported by an Intel Foundation Ph.D. Fellowship.
1conﬁdentiality by preventing any single agent from decrypting messages. How-
ever, the cryptosystem used in Civitas requires all agents to be present throughout
decryption, thus weakening availability.
In the work reported here, we replace Civitas’s cryptosystem with a threshold
cryptosystem that uses Shamir secret sharing [8] for the private key. If no more
than t agents fail, then the decryption protocol is guaranteed to terminate with a
correct decryption. An agents fails when it deviates from the speciﬁed protocol,
perhaps by crashing, by exhibiting malicious behavior, by committing accidental
errors, etc.; an agent that has not failed is honest. Similarly, the key generation pro-
tocol is guaranteed to terminate with a correctly shared private key if no more than
t agents fail. Moreover, no collusion of t or fewer agents can gain any informa-
tion about the distributed private key. This threshold cryptosystem offers a better
tradeoff between conﬁdentiality and availability than the original cryptosystem.
2 Design
2.1 Key Generation
We use the distributed key generation protocol proposed by Gennaro et al. [6]. The
protocol runs in two phases: commitment to a jointly generated secret x, and ex-
traction of the public key. Assuming that at most t < n=2 tellers can fail, the
protocol guarantees that a set of at least t + 1 tellers that follow the protocol cor-
rectly is able to successfully generate a key, and that any collusion of up to t tellers
does not reveal the value of x. The value of x is never revealed by the protocol
itself.
2.1.1 Commitment phase
We assume an El Gamal group G described by parameters p, q and g, where p and
q are primes, such that p = 2kq + 1 for some integer constant k > 0, group G is
the order q subgroup of Z
p, and g is a generator of G.
Each teller i selects two random polynomials fi(z) = ai0 + ai1z + :: + aitzt
and f0
i(z) = bi0 + bi1z + :: + bitzt of degree t. (Recall that t is the maximum
number of tellers that is allowed to fail.) The coefﬁcients of each polynomial are
randomly chosen from Zq. Let zi = ai0 = fi(0); this is the random value that teller
i contributes to the joint secret x. Each teller commits to the selected polynomials
by running an instance of Pedersen-VSS [7], using fi and f0
i and an additional
parameter h randomly selected from G. Pedersen-VSS is a veriﬁable secret-sharing
scheme that allows one of the agents, called the dealer, to share a secret with a set
2of n agents, such that a set of t + 1 honest agents can reconstruct the secret and
detect whether the dealer was malicious.
Every teller sends points sij = fi(j)mod q and s0
ij = f0
i(j)mod q to every
other teller j on private channels, which must be authenticated and conﬁdential.
Call these points the private commitments of teller i. Since zi is a term in fi, every
point sij contains information about zi. Moreover, given at least t + 1 points, zi
can be successfully recovered. To prove that the private commitments are correct,
each teller also publishes
Cik = gaikhbik mod p for k 2 [0:::t]:
Each teller i can verify the correctness of the private commitments received from
teller j by checking that
gsjih
s0
ji =
t Y
k=0
(Cjk)ik
mod p for j 2 [1:::n]: (1)
If the private commitments fail the check, then teller i issues a complaint
against teller j. Teller j responds to this complaint by revealing sji and s0
ji that
match (1) to all tellers. A teller that receives more than t complaints or fails to
provide a response that satisﬁes (1) is automatically disqualiﬁed and its zi is not
included in the joint secret x. A teller that receives fewer than t complaints or
responds with the correct private commitment is allowed to continue participat-
ing in the key generation protocol. Note that tellers that deviate from the protocol
can generate at most t complaints against a teller i that behaves correctly. These
complaints reveal at most t points of fi, but at least t + 1 points are necessary
to determine the value of zi. Thus complaints and responses do not reveal any
information about the joint secret.
At the end of the commitment phase each teller calculates a set of qualiﬁed
tellers, Qual, that correctly shared sij and s0
ij. Gennaro et al. prove that this set is
the same for all tellers. The secret key share for teller i is
xi =
X
j2Qual
sji mod q:
The public key share for teller i is
yi = gzi mod p:
The joint secret—that is, the shared private key—is
x =
X
i2Qual
zi mod q:
32.1.2 Public key extraction phase
The tellers extract the value of the shared public key Y via Feldman-VSS [4].
Feldman-VSS is a veriﬁable secret sharing scheme that extends Shamir secret shar-
ing by allowing the recipients of the shares to verify that they are consistent—that
is, any set of t + 1 shares identiﬁes the secret selected by the dealer. If a teller i
misbehaves during this phase, then its contribution to x can be reconstructed from
the set fsij j j 2 Qualg of private commitments by a set of at least t + 1 honest
tellers from Qual, using Lagrange interpolation to reconstruct fi(0).
Hereafter, we consider only tellers that are members of Qual. Each teller i
publishes
Aik = gaik mod p for k 2 [0:::t]:
Note that Ai0 is the value of the public key share yi of teller i. Each teller i can
verify the correctness of the values Ajk received from teller j by verifying that
gsji =
t Y
k=0
(Ajk)ik
mod p: (2)
If the check fails, then teller i complains against teller j by publicly revealing
values sji and s0
ji that fail (2) but satisfy (1).
If at least one valid complaint is issued against teller i, then a set of at least
t + 1 honest tellers can reconstruct zi by running the reconstruction phase of
Pedersen-VSS, using Lagrange interpolation:
zi =
X
j2Qual
sij  j;Qual mod q;
j;Qual =
Y
l2Qualnfjg
l
l   j
:
The value of the public shared key is
Y =
Y
i2Qual
yi mod p: (3)
A detailed proof of correctness of the above scheme can be found in [6] and is
omitted here.
2.1.3 Communication channels
Public messages require only authenticity and integrity, which are already provided
by the existing bulletin board interface in Civitas.
4The communication model used in [6] assumes the existence of private chan-
nels, because Pedersen-VSS requires that the private commitments are sent pri-
vately. We provide such a channel using a combination of encryption, signatures,
and the bulletin board, which was already implemented in Civitas. Each private
message, along with the identiﬁers of the tellers involved, is signed under the pri-
vate key of the sender. The result, together with the identiﬁers of the tellers in-
volved, is encrypted under the public key of the recipient and posted to the bulletin
board. This approach binds the identiﬁers of the principals involved to both layers
of signing and encryption, defending against attacks in [3]. Our implementation
guarantees secrecy, authenticity and integrity of the private messages and satisﬁes
the requirements of the communication model in [6].
2.2 Encryption
Encryption under the threshold scheme is identical to the non-distributed, non-
threshold case using Y , deﬁned in (3), as the public key.
2.3 Decryption
We use the decryption scheme proposed by Cramer et al. [2]. Let ciphertext c be
the encryption of message M under key Y with random nonce r, where
c = (a;b);
a = gr mod p;
b = M  Y r mod p:
The decryption protocol is as follows:
 Teller i publishes share ai = axi mod p, along with a zero-knowledge proof
that
logg gxi = loga ai: (4)
 Teller i collects the shares posted by the other tellers in Qual.
 Teller i discards the shares that fail the proof.
5 Teller i computes, using a set  of at least t + 1 shares that satisfy (4),
A =
Y
j2
a
j;
j mod p
= a
P
k2Qual zk mod qmod p
= Y r mod p;
where
j; =
Y
l2nfjg
l
l   j
:
The decryption of c is b
A mod p = M.
3 Implementation
3.1 Integration and New Functionality
Even though the algorithms for encryption and decryption under the pre-existing
distributed scheme are not identical to those in the new scheme, we successfully
reused parts of the existing implementation in implementing the threshold scheme.
Whereas encryption remained unchanged, decryption required only minor modiﬁ-
cations. In contrast, the key generation protocol was replaced almost entirely and
necessitated the implementation of two new kinds of channels.
Civitas already had all the functionality required for generating members of El
Gamal groups and mathematical operations within those groups, as well as meth-
ods to compute zero-knowledge proofs to exhibit the knowledge and equality of
discrete logarithms. The latter is necessary for the veriﬁcation of decryption shares
as part of the distributed decryption process, the former is used in key generation,
encryption and decryption.
3.1.1 Decryption
We did not change the process by which decryption shares are generated; however,
we did change the mechanism by which decryption shares are combined. Civitas
originally reported an error and failed upon identifying a single missing or incor-
rect decryption share, where incorrect means that the share’s accompanying proof
failed to verify. Such occurrences are now merely logged and the process is al-
lowed to continue. During combination, the number of correct shares is compared
to the minimum requirement (t + 1) and, if insufﬁcient, an error is raised and de-
cryption is abandoned. We also changed combination of decryption shares to use
Lagrange coefﬁcients.
6To support the new functionality, we made some minor additions to the ElGa-
malParameters class, extending it with additional ﬁelds: t, denoting the maximum
number of failed nodes to be tolerated, and h, needed for Pedersen-VSS. Both
parameters are shared by all participants.
3.1.2 Private Channels
The security proof of Gennaro et al. [6] assumes channels that prevent modiﬁ-
cation of messages, and untappable channels that ensure conﬁdentiality between
pairs of nodes. But according to both Cramer et al.[2] and Gennaro [5], these as-
sumptions can be discharged with appropriate cryptographic mechanisms for con-
ﬁdentiality, authentication, and integrity. Thus, on top of the bulletin board we
implemented two channel abstractions, one private but both providing authentica-
tion and integrity. The basic, non-private channel utilizes cryptographic hashes
(for integrity) and signatures (for authenticity). The private channel adds encryp-
tion to these features for conﬁdentiality. The channel itself is implemented in
jif-src/tabulation/server/BBChannel.jif, with two additional interfaces used for the
message types it sends: XMLSerializableBroadcast, and a sub-interface XMLSe-
rializableUnicast, both in jif-src/common.
The key generation protocol in the new cryptosystem is fundamentally differ-
ent than that which previously existed in Civitas. Along with the communication
channels just described, this protocol represents the most signiﬁcant changes to
the codebase. The message classes used by the key generation protocol are imple-
mented in jif-src/common:
 Commitment
 PrivProofResponse
 PubKeyShareComplaint
 PublicKeyShareList
 PublicKeyVote
 ReconInfo
 SharePoint
 SharePointComplaints
 ShareResponsesBase
7In addition, we added several new methods to XMLDeserializers to facilitate
their recovery from the XML format in which they are posted to the BulletinBoard.
A helper class, QualSet, also in jif-src/common, manages the qualiﬁcation status of
tellers during the key generation process. We added the Point class to jif-src/crypto
to provide a holder for the actual representation of the pair of polynomial eval-
uations that make up a SharePoint, which is a CivitasBigInteger. The concrete
implementation of that class, PointC, can be found in java-src/crypto/concrete.
We added several new functions to CryptoFactoryC (and their signatures to
CryptoFactory):
 generatePolynomial
 generateThreshKeyGenCommitment
 evalPolyModQ (despite its name, it does not perform modular arithmetic)
 validateSharePointVsCommitment
 getMaxNumberOfFailedTellers
 aggregateSharePointsSumFactory
 thresholdPublicKeyShareListFactory
 constructKeyPairShare
 validatePublicKeyShareListVsPoint
 reconstructPublicShare
 productModP
 elGamalKeyShareFactory
 elGamalPublicKeyFactory
In implementing key generation, we had to address a few non-obvious details:
 To compute a given Lagrange coefﬁcient we ﬁrst compute the value of the
denominator using BigInteger values, then take the modular inverse of the
result and perform a modular multiplication by the BigInteger value of the
numerator. The resulting value still belongs to G and is represented as a
BigInteger.
 Calculation of sij: The sij values are not members of G, and thus are calcu-
lated (when evaluating the polynomials) without modular arithmetic.
8 Calculation of sii: It is essential to the correct determination of private key
shares that each teller compute the evaluation of its polynomial at its own
index (sii). Although this value is never transmitted nor validated by other
tellers, it is used in the production of the private key share.
 Public key dissemination: The public key that each teller calculates privately
at the conclusion of the key generation protocol must be agreed upon and
stored. This is done via quorum. Since the system is guaranteed to have
only t failed tellers, then any public key value agreed upon by at least t + 1
tellers is guaranteed to include a vote from a correct teller and therefore
be the correct value. Each teller therefore posts its vote for the public key.
All consumers collect these votes for the public key and select the one that
receives that quorum of votes.
3.2 Testing
Due to constraints (mostly imposed by Jif itself) on the ability to call individ-
ual functions provided by CryptoFactoryC, we conducted unit testing of the non-
channel code with a separate testing method implemented in TTProtocol.jif. This
method simulates the execution of the entire key generation protocol, including
reconstruction and the encrytpion/decryption of a trivial message from the per-
spective of all participants. This test exercises all of the CryptoFactoryC helper
methods. But this test does not provide coverage of the message classes, nor does
it directly test the key generation protocol method. For the former, these classes
are trivial and readily tested via the channel tests described next. For the latter, we
chose to test key generation in a non-distributed way because of the difﬁculty of en-
gineering a distributed test. Integration tests, conducted via the existing experiment
framework, provide the assurance of the actual code path.
We tested both the private and public channels by using them in the old (i.e.,
non-threshold) Civitas key generation protocol. It was much easier to use this
protocol than to create a separate stand-alone unit test, because the set-up of the
channel requires a large number of Civitas components to be initialized. Since the
key share commitment phase of the old protocol uses hashed and signed messages,
it was an ideal test case for the new public channel that we built. To test the public
channel, we modiﬁed Civitas’s old key generation protocol to use the public chan-
nel instead of posting messages to the bulletin board. To test the private channel,
we introduced a dummy message that was sent privately during the run of the key
generation protocol. We aborted key generation if there was an error sending or re-
ceiving the private message; since all tellers are required to be present to generate
the key in the old protocol, we could reliably detect these errors.
9A Protocol Speciﬁcation
In the following protocols, let N be the space of nonces and let publish(m)
denote publishing message m on the bulletin board BB.
El Gamal Threshold Parameters
((p;q;g);t;h) - where (p;q;g) are the regular El Gamal parameters,
h   G is the member of El Gamal group G, and t is the maximum
number of tellers allowed to fail. It is assumed that t < n
2, where n
is the total number of tellers, and that the adversaries can’t compute
logg h.
ALGORITHM: Send Public Message
Input: meta - meta string
from id - sender identiﬁer
m - message to be sent
ks - RSA private signing key
1. r   N
2. s = SignRSA(hash(meta;from id;m);ks)
3. publish(meta;from id;m;s)
ALGORITHM: Send Private Message
Input: meta - meta string
from id - sender identiﬁer
to id - recipient identiﬁer
m - message to be sent
ks - RSA private signing key
Ke - RSA public encryption key
1. r   N
2. k   GenAES(1l), where l is the the security parameter for AES
3. ck = EncRSA(k;Ke)
4. s = SignRSA(hash(meta;from id;to id;m);ks)
5. cm = EncAES(meta;from id;to id;m;s;k)
6. publish(meta;from id;to id;ck;cm)
10ALGORITHM: Receive Public Messages
Input: meta - meta string
from id - sender identiﬁer
K - RSA public key of teller with id from id
Output: RecvPubMsg(meta;from id)
1. Output
f(meta;from id;m)j(meta;from id;m;s) 2 BB
^ VerRSA(hash(meta;from id;m);s;K)g
ALGORITHM: Receive Private Messages
Input: meta - meta string
from id - sender identiﬁer
to id - recipient identiﬁer
kd - RSA private decryption key
K - RSA public key of teller with id from id
Output: RecvPrivMsg(meta;from id;to id;kd)
1. SM = ;
2. Foreachmessagefm : m = (meta;from id;to id;ck;cm) 2 BBg:
- k = DecRSA(ck;kd)
- (meta0;from id0;to id0;M;s) := DecAES(cm;k)
- if VerRSA(hash(meta0;from id0;to id0;M);s;K)
then SM := SM [ M
3. Output SM
11PROTOCOL: Distributed Threshold El Gamal Key Generation
Due to: Gennaro et al. [6]
Principals: Tabulation tellers TT1;:::;TTn
Public Input: Distributed Threshold El Gamal Parameters (p;q;g;h;t)
Set of RSA public keys for each teller, fKTTi : 1  i  ng
eid - election id; idi;:::;idn - teller ids
Private input (TTi): RSA private signing key ksTTi
RSA private decryption key kTTi
Output: Public key Y, public key shares yi
1. TTi: Generate polynomials and public and private commitments:
- Let polynomial fi(z) = ai0 + ai1z + ::: + aitzt,
where aik   Zq for k 2 [0:::t]
- Let zi = ai0 = f(0)
- Letpolynomialf0
i(z) = bi0+bi1z+:::+bitzt, wherebik   Zq
for k 2 [0:::t]
- Cik = gaikhbik mod p for k 2 [0:::t]
- sij = fi(j), s0
ij = f0
i(j)mod q for j 2 [1:::n]
2. TTi: Send Commitments:
- Send Public Message(pub cmt;i;(Ci0;:::;Cit);ksTTi)
- Send Private Message(priv cmt;i;j;(sij;s0
ij);ksTTi;KTTj)
3. TTi: Verify commitments:
- Receive Public Messages(pub cmt;j) for j 2 [1:::n]
- Receive Private Messages(priv cmt;j;i;kTTi)forj 2 [1:::n]
- Verify that
gsjih
s0
ji =
t Y
k=0
(Cjk)ik
mod p for j 2 [1:::n]
If the check fails issue a complaint from i against j:
Send Public Message(cmt compl;i;(i;j);ksTTi)
4. TTi: Retrieve complaints against teller i and send responses:
- CP = Receive Public Messages(cmt compl;j)forj 2 [1:::n]
- For every complaint from teller TTj against teller TTi, (j;i):
Send Public Message(cmt compl resp;i;((i;j);sij;s0
ij);ksTTi)
- ForeverycomplaintagainstTTj, incrementcomplaintscounter
cj := cj + 1
125. TTi: Verifycomplaintresponsesanddeterminethesetofqualiﬁedtellers:
- CR = Receive Public Messages(cmt compl resp;j)
for j 2 [1:::n]
- For every j 2 [1:::n]:
If either:
(cj > t), or
CR contains a response from teller TTj that fails the check
in step 3,
then Disq := Disq [ fTTjg
- Qual = fTT1;:::;TTng \ Disq
6. TTi: Compute private key share xi and publish public key share com-
mitments:
- xi =
X
j2Qual
sji mod q
- Aik = gaik mod p for k 2 [0:::t]
- Send Public Message(keyshare cmt;i;(Ai1;:::;Ait);ksTTi)
7. TTi: Verify public key share commitments for every teller j 2 Qual:
- CP = Receive Public Messages(keyshare cmt;j)
- Disq := ;
- Verify that
gsji =
t Y
k=0
(Ajk)ik
mod p
If the check fails:
Send Public Message(keyshare cmt compl;i;((i;j);sji;s0
ji);ksTTi),
where sji;s0
ji satisfy the check at step 3.
8. TTi: Verify complaints and update the set of disqualiﬁed tellers:
- CP = Receive Public Messages(keyshare cmt compl;j)
for j 2 Qual
- For each teller j that received a complaint in CP:
Verify that the complaint is valid using the checks in steps 3
and 7 (a valid complaint will satisfy the check in 3, but will
fail the check in 7).
If the complaint is valid:
Disq := Disq [ fTTjg
Send Public Message(reconst cmt;i;((j;i);sji;s0
ji);ksTTi)
139. TTi: Collect missing commitments for the disqualiﬁed tellers, perform
reconstruction of the missing public key shares:
- CP = Receive Public Messages(reconst cmt;j)
for j 2 Disq
- For each teller j 2 Disq:
zj =
X
k2Qual
sjk  k;Qual mod q,
where sjk;s0
jk 2 CP pass the check in step 3 and
k;Qual =
Y
l2Qualnfkg
l
l   k
10. TTi: yi = gzi mod p
Y =
Q
j2Qual yj mod p
PROTOCOL: Distributed Threshold El Gamal Decryption
Due to: Cramer et al. [2]
Principals: TTi - tabulation teller i
Public Input: (p;q;g;h;t) - Distributed Threshold El Gamal Parameters
Y - shared public key
c = (a;b) - ciphertext, where a = gr mod p and b = M  Y r mod p
for plaintext M and public key y
yi - public key share
Private input(TTi): xi - private key share of teller i
Qual - set of qualiﬁed tellers
Output: ThreshDistDec(c;X)
1. TTi: Publish share ai = axi mod p and proof EqDlogs(g;a;gxi;ai)
2. TTi: Let  = fj : j 2 Qual ^ EqDlogs(g;a;gxj;aj)g
3. TTi: Abort unless jj  t + 1
4. TTi: Compute A =
Y
j2
a
j;
j mod p, where j; =
Y
l2nfjg
l
l   j
5. TTi: Output M = b
A mod p
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